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This paper offers a grounded theory approach to a review of behavioral information security research. Behavioral information 
security research is in a nascent state, yet it is growing rapidly due to the importance of information security in organizations. 
This review examines a particular problem in security research, namely the lack of clear conceptualizations of employee 
compliance and noncompliance with security policies and norms. This review finds that definitions of compliance and 
noncompliance are taken-for-granted, which may indicate danger in examining results across studies. Based on existing 
research of compliance in the information systems field and other fields, this paper identifies four types of compliance and 
five types of noncompliance along with dimensions of compliance and noncompliance using a grounded theory approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Securing organizational information systems (IS) is an important organizational concern (Richardson, 2009; Richardson, 
2011). To protect organizational information from organizational insiders, namely employees, organizations establish 
security controls (e.g., information security policies, computer monitoring, security training, etc.). Many information security 
studies examine the behavioral effect security controls have on employees (e.g., Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler and 
Boss, 2009; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat, 2010; Straub and Nance, 1990). These studies tend to examine compliance 
and noncompliance with ISPs and behavioral security norms. Based on the review in this paper, we find that many of these 
studies fail to offer even a simple definition of compliance and noncompliance. By taking the definition of compliance and 
noncompliance for granted, these studies assume that compliance is a simple concept. However, we know from other fields, 
such as management and healthcare, that many types of compliance and noncompliance exist (Barofsky, 1978; Dracup and 
Meleis, 1982; Philippe and Durand, 2011; Smith, Organ and Near, 1983). Unclear conceptualizations of constructs, 
particularly dependent constructs such as compliance and noncompliance, can limit a field of research (DeLone and McLean, 
1992). Therefore, it is essential for IS security studies to clearly identify the type of compliance they examine. 
This paper offers a review of conceptualizations of compliance and noncompliance in IS and non-IS literature using a 
grounded theory approach to provide a taxonomy of compliance and noncompliance that can inform research about 
information security compliance and noncompliance in organizations. Importantly, security research has begun to develop 
new conceptualizations of compliance and noncompliance (e.g., Boss et al., 2009; Workman, Bommer and Straub, 2008). 
However, many information security studies examine broad and ambiguous conceptualizations of compliance, or more 
commonly, behavioral intentions to comply. This paper attempts to bring these scattered conceptualizations of compliance 
and noncompliance together into a single taxonomy. Providing a taxonomy of compliance and noncompliance will provide 
researchers with clear conceptualizations of compliance and noncompliance and will make cross-study examinations more 
feasible. 
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To develop the taxonomy, we conducted an electronic search of literature on IS security compliance and noncompliance in 
the basket-11 journals identified by Clark et al. (2011) (e.g., MISQ, ISR, JMIS, ISJ, EJIS, JAIS, JSIS, JIT, I&M, CAIS, and 
DSS) using the EBSCO Complete Database. These journals are known for their quality and unique ideas and offer a 
representative view of the literature. Keywords such as “information security,” “compliance,” “noncompliance,” and 
“violation” were used in the search. Citations were also examined to find articles in other journals that contribute novel 
conceptualizations of compliance and noncompliance. Not all articles from the citation lists were included in the review, 
because the purpose of this paper is to examine differing conceptualizations. To the extent that other articles did not offer 
new insight beyond what was found in the basket-11 journals, they were excluded from the review. Theoretical sampling of 
this nature is appropriate for grounded theory studies (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). A total of 27 articles were selected for 
coding. A grounded theory approach was used to extract important categories and dimensions of compliance and 
noncompliance from the articles. Axial coding (Corbin et al., 1990) was used to develop the categories of the taxonomies. 
Importantly, this paper is a research in progress. The taxonomies in this paper are an initial classification based on a primary 
round of coding. Further coding will be conducted to ensure that the categories and dimensions are adequate and at an 
appropriate level of abstraction. 
This paper directs researchers’ attention to the importance of developing sound conceptualizations of a phenomenon before 
collecting data. This paper also identifies different types of compliance and noncompliance that can be used to ensure that 
future IS security research is comparable and clearly situated. The remainder of this paper continues as follows. First, the 
taxonomy of compliance is offered. Second, the taxonomy of noncompliance is offered. Lastly, implications of the taxonomy 
are discussed and directions for future research are offered. 
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF COMPLIANCE 
Based on initial coding of the literature, two dimensions arose from the literature—goal-orientation and conscious 
engagement. Goal-orientation refers to the extent to which individuals’ security behaviors are directed toward accomplishing 
secure outcomes rather than toward complying with predefined procedures. Thus, goal directed security behaviors are 
focused on making IS more secure and securing organizational information, whereas procedural behaviors are focused on 
following policy. Goal directed behaviors, therefore, may go beyond what is required by policy in order to ensure that 
organizational information is protected. At the core of goal-orientation is motivation. Goal-orientation implies an intrinsic 
drive to ensure a secure information environment, while procedurally oriented behavior is likely based on extrinsic 
motivation. Conscious engagement refers to the extent to which individuals thoughtfully and diligently engage in secure 
behaviors. Conscious engagement, however, does not refer to the amount of work an individual must go through in order to 
complete a security requirement. For example, an individual who habitually completes organizational security requirements 
may work many hours in performing the security tasks; however, because the behaviors are habitual, by definition they are 
automatic and require less thoughtful engagement (Verplanken and Orbell, 2003). Although goal-orientation and conscious 
engagement are related, they are not the same. Goal-orientation captures the motivation to comply, while conscious 
engagement captures the behavioral enactment of compliance. Although motivation may lead to more conscious engagement, 
motivation is not actual engagement. Importantly, theoretical dimensions do not need to be orthogonal (Dubin, 1969). 
Based on initial coding, we identify four distinct types of compliance—rote, habitually compliance; rote, dutiful compliance; 
well-intentioned, committed compliance; and proactive, committed compliance. The taxonomy of compliance is presented in 
Table 1. The sections below describe each type of compliance in greater detail. Because of the confusion that exists in 
definitions of compliance, we only mention security studies related to each type of compliance if the fit is obvious. Many of 
the ambiguously defined conceptualizations of compliance are likely to capture elements of several types of compliance. 
 Low goal-orientation High goal-orientation 
Low conscious engagement Rote, habitual compliance Well-intentioned, committed compliance 
High conscious engagement Rote, dutiful compliance Proactive, committed compliance  
Table 1. Taxonomy of Security Compliance 
Rote, Habitual Compliance 
Rote, habitual compliance is characterized by low conscious engagement and low goal-orientation. We define rote, habitual 
compliance as behaviors that align with organizational information security requirements which are nearly routine and 
automatic to the individual engaging in the behavior. Habitual behaviors are characterized as routine and automatic 
(Verplanken et al., 2003); therefore, concerted and thoughtful effort may not be required to perform them (Guo, Yuan, Archer 
and Connelly, 2011). Habitual behaviors may vary by person, as employees’ routines may differ. Some behaviors may be so 
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deeply embedded within the social fabric of an organization they become second nature. This is what Kyngäs et al. (2000) 
refer to as compliance as ideology. 
Few security studies have examined habitual compliance. Vance et al. (2012) is the only study we reviewed that directly 
measures habitual behavior. They show that habitual behavior is a salient factor in information security policy compliance. 
Future research might further examine the factors that affect the development of rote, habitual compliance. Managers and 
researchers may desire to find ways to foster habitual compliance, particularly for security requirements that need frequent, 
yet thoughtless attention. Such actions might include simple behaviors like logging off of a computer before leaving the 
computer. 
Rote, Dutiful Compliance 
Rote dutiful compliance is characterized as being low in goal-orientation, but high in conscious engagement. We define rote, 
dutiful compliance as deliberate, procedural adherence to organizational information security requirements by an individual 
who is aware of the security requirements. Though employees who engage in this form of compliance may exert thoughtful 
effort in fulfilling security requirements, their behavior is likely to be procedural in nature and not directed toward the goal of 
securing organizational information. Choobineh et al. (2007) suggest that security management in organizations is dominated 
by a “checklist culture,” while it should be dominated by a more proactive and goal directed culture. Procedural rules may 
lead to procedural behaviors that fail to achieve the initial purpose of the established rule (Choobineh et al., 2007; Lehman 
and Ramanujam, 2009). Procedural rules emphasize checklist behaviors rather than behaviors that encourage the pursuit of 
desired outcomes (Lange, 2008; Lehman et al., 2009). Overlap may exist, however, between the outcomes of procedural 
compliance and goal-directed compliance. 
Rote, dutiful compliance may be a remnant of a “checklist culture”; however, this type of compliance may also result from 
organizational structure and individuals’ characteristics and attitudes. For example, extrinsically motivated organizational 
incentives, such as sanctions and rewards, may lead to positive behavior in the short-term, but may be detrimental to long-
term behavior because extrinsic incentives may alter individuals’ perceptions of tasks (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). Thus, 
sanctions, computer monitoring, and rewards may lead individuals to meet minimum security requirements through rote 
compliance to security policy while missing the greater goal of the security requirements.  
D’Arcy and Herath (2011) note that security deterrence research has mixed results when using compliance, rather than 
noncompliance, as the dependent variable of the study. They suggest that compliance may not be an appropriate construct for 
studies employing general deterrence theory. This somewhat limits the examination of different types of security controls 
(e.g., security training, sanctions, computer monitoring, and moral development) in a single study. We agree that goal-
directed compliance may not be useful for deterrence studies; however, we believe that measures of compliance that capture 
rote, dutiful compliance may provide more consistent findings. Since rote, dutiful compliance is likely to be extrinsically 
motivated, sanctions may show consistence effects when measured properly. Examining rote, dutiful compliance may open 
the possibility of reliably studying deterrent and other preventive security controls within a single study. 
Well-Intentioned, Committed Compliance 
Well-intentioned, committed compliance is characterized by low conscious engagement and high goal-orientation. We define 
well-intentioned, committed compliance as passive or haphazard engagement in deliberate and thoughtful security behaviors 
that meet and possibly exceed organizational information security requirements by an individual who is cognizant of and 
concerned about security outcomes. Well-intentioned, committed compliance may result in compliance with the minimum 
security requirements of the organization, but may only give rise to occasional proactive security behaviors. The lack of 
conscious engagement put toward proactive behaviors may result from laziness or limits on time and cognitive attention. 
By definition, well-intentioned, committed compliance includes behaviors that at least meet minimum security requirements 
of the organization. It is likely that well-intentioned, committed compliance exists on a continuum with idle and prioritized 
negligence, two forms of noncompliance described later. When conscious engagement drops extremely low, employees are 
likely to become negligent, even in adherence to the minimum security requirements of the organization. Thus, well-
intentioned, committed compliance may become negligence. The motivation behind the negligence will determine whether 
low conscious engagement leads to idle or prioritized negligence.  
There are no existing security studies that fit cleanly with this type of compliance though Barofsky (1978) describes 
compliance of this nature in a healthcare setting, suggesting that patients may desire to be healthy but never put forth the 
effort to become healthy. Well-intentioned, committed compliance deserves future attention. Most importantly, research 
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should examine how conscious engagement can be increased and sustained to ensure that well-intentioned behavior becomes 
proactive, committed compliance. 
Proactive, Committed Compliance 
Proactive, committed compliance is characterized by high conscious engagement and high goal-orientation. We define 
proactive, committed compliance as active engagement in deliberate and thoughtful security behaviors that meet and exceed 
organizational information security requirements by an individual who is cognizant of and concerned about security 
outcomes. Proactive, committed compliance differs from well-intentioned, committed compliance at the execution stage. At 
the execution stage, the level of conscious engagement will determine whether behaviors meet minimum security 
requirements and occasionally exceed them, or consistently exceed them. The goal-directed nature of proactive, committed 
compliance suggests that employees may seek new and better ways to secure organizational information. Proactive behaviors 
may include reading security magazines and publications, remaining aware of the latest security software and trends, 
encouraging management to adopt security software, and other like behaviors.   
It is likely that many of the security studies with ambiguous conceptualizations of compliance attempt to capture this type of 
compliance. Boss et al. (2009) capture proactive, committed security behaviors. They examine precaution taking behavior 
which they define as “the degree to which individuals perceive they take measures to secure their computers and deal with 
information security in accordance with prescribed corporate security policies and procedures as well as through individual, 
proactive actions” (p. 155). Based on the work of Boss et al. (2009), employees may engage in proactive security behaviors. 
Ng et al. (2009) also examine behaviors that are more proactive in nature. They study protective computer security behavior 
which they define as “behaviors that will reduce the risk and/or impact of security incidents” (p. 817). 
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF NONCOMPLIANCE 
Based initial coding, we conceptualize noncompliance as consisting of three dimensions—the level of behavioral awareness, 
the level of maliciousness, and whether the noncompliant actions are intended to benefit oneself or others. Behavioral 
awareness refers to the extent to which individuals are consciously aware of their noncompliant behaviors. Maliciousness 
refers to the extent to which individuals engage in noncompliant behaviors with the intent to cause harm to the organization. 
And self-benefitting behavior refers to noncompliant actions taken with the motive to gratify the individual committing the 
offense, while other-benefitting behavior refers to noncompliant actions taken with the motive to help others (e.g., the 
organization, clients, or coworkers) or to improve the organizational environment as a whole (e.g., ensuring fair 
organizational practices). Some overlap exists between these dimensions, as depicted in Table 2. For example, highly 
malicious behavior is committed with intent to harm. The fact that intention exists in the commission of the behavior, 
suggests that behavioral awareness must be high. Similarly, behavior that is not malicious and low in behavioral awareness 
will have no motive attached to the behavior. That is, awareness and intention do not exists in these behaviors; therefore, 
motives to benefit oneself or others by engaging in the misbehavior are not relevant.  
Based on the three dimensions, we identify 5 distinct forms of noncompliance—unintentional misbehavior, idle negligence, 
prioritized negligence, deviant behavior, and well-intentioned misbehavior. The taxonomy of noncompliance is presented in 
Table 2. The sections below describe each type of noncompliance in greater detail and provide examples from information 
security literature. 
Low maliciousness High maliciousness  
Self-benefitting Other-benefitting Self-benefitting Other-benefitting 
Low behavioral 
awareness 
Unintentional misbehavior  
High behavioral 
awareness 






Table 2. Taxonomy of Noncompliance 
Unintentional Misbehavior 
Unintentional misbehavior is characterized by low behavioral awareness and low maliciousness. There is not motive behind 
the misbehavior; therefore, unintentional misbehavior is neither self- nor other-benefitting. We define unintentional 
misbehavior as commissive or omissive behavior that is harmful to the security of organizational information unbeknown to 
the individual engaging in the behavior. Unintentional misbehavior may result from employees who are unaware of security 
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policies and procedures or from bad habits which employees form. Habitual behavior is automatic and requires less conscious 
thought (Verplanken et al., 2003); therefore, employees who have bad security habits may not recognize their behavior. 
Rote, habitual compliance is likely to be on a continuum with unintentional misbehavior. Unintentional noncompliance may 
be due to bad security habits. Because habitual behavior is automatic (Verplanken et al., 2003), employees may be unaware 
or less conscious of their noncompliant actions until after an action is performed. Thus, to the extent that habitual behavior 
falls within or without the bounds of security requirements, an individual’s behavior may be classified as rote, habitual 
compliance or unintentional misbehavior.  
No studies in our review directly examined this form of noncompliance, though it was mentioned by some authors (e.g., Guo 
et al., 2011). Studies that examine information security policy awareness (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010) are likely to capture 
some elements of unintentional misbehavior in measures of noncompliance. As research on habit in information security 
research (e.g., Vance et al., 2012) becomes more prevalent, it may be important to develop measures of noncompliance that 
clearly capture unintentional misbehavior.   
Idle Negligence 
Idle negligence is characterized by high behavioral awareness, low maliciousness, and self-benefitting motives. We define 
idle negligence as the intentional neglect of security behaviors by an individual for reasons that benefit the individual. This 
type of compliance consists of mostly omissive rather than commissive behavior. Idle negligence is likely the result of 
laziness, desires to find shortcuts in completing work, desires to enhance personal convenience, or attitudes that security is 
not important. 
Guo et al. (2011) examine nonmalicious security violations, which consist of conscious behavior that is meant to benefit the 
violator with no direct intent to harm the organization. This places their conceptualization of noncompliance well within idle 
negligence. Workman et al. (2008) also provide a conceptualization of noncompliance that can be partially categorized as idle 
negligence. They examine omissive security behavior. However, they do not make a distinction between self-benefitting and 
other-benefitting motives. Therefore, the omissive behavior in Workman et al. (2008) may also capture elements of 
prioritized negligence. 
Prioritized Negligence 
Prioritized negligence is characterized by high behavioral awareness, low maliciousness, and other-benefitting motives. We 
define prioritized negligence as the intentional neglect of security behaviors by an individual to ensure that time and 
resources are available for other tasks. This type of compliance also consists of mostly omissive rather than commissive 
behavior. Prioritized negligence differs from idle negligence in the motive for neglecting a security requirement. Idle 
negligence results from desires to ease one’s own burden, while prioritized negligence results from desires to assist others. 
Employees’ time is limited and work expectations and work overload are common problems in organizations (Ahuja, 
Chudoba, Kacmar, McKnight and George, 2007). Employees, therefore, must choose which activities receive their time and 
attention. Additionally, even if sufficient time existed, humans have limited cognitive capacity (Zhu and Watts, 2010). 
Individuals’ ability to focus attention on multiple items at one time is limited. As such, security activities may suffer from 
lack of time or attention. Importantly, prioritized negligence does not consist of forgetful behaviors. Forgetful behaviors 
would fall under unintentional misbehavior. Prioritized negligence occurs when an employee knowingly neglects a security 
behavior in order to accomplish another task. 
As suggested above Workman et al. (2008) provide a conceptualization of noncompliance that partially falls under idle 
negligence. Similarly, Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) found evidence that work overload hindered compliant behavior, 
though this was not the focus of their study. Future studies should consider how work requirements in an organization affect 
employee security behaviors. Future studies that examine this type of noncompliance might explore the position of the 
employee. It may be that some job positions require greater work and cognitive loads than other positions, increasing the 
likelihood of prioritized negligence. 
Deviant Behavior 
Deviant behavior is characterized by high behavioral awareness, high maliciousness, and self-benefitting motives. We define 
deviant behavior as the intentional commission of insecure information security behaviors by an individual for reasons that 
benefit the individual. Deviant behaviors include vengeful behaviors, theft, destruction of both physical and informational IS 
resources, and other intentionally harmful behaviors. Deviant behavior covers behavior committed to harm the organization 
as a whole or to harm an employee or manager of the organization that has the effect of harming the organization. It is not 
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concerned, however, with behavior that is harmful to an individual in the organization and not to the organization. Such 
behavior falls outside the scope of this paper as we are focused on security in organizations and not personal information 
security. 
Many security studies examine this form of compliance. Straub (1990) and Straub and Nance (1990) examine computer 
abuse, which they define as “the unauthorized and deliberate misuse of assets of the local organizational information system 
by individuals, including violations against: hardware (and other physical assets associated with computers, such as theft or 
damage to terminals, CPU's, disk drives, and printers), programs (such as theft or modification of programs, data (such as 
embezzlement or modification of data), and computer service (such as unauthorized use of service or purposeful interruption 
of service)” (Straub, 1990, , p. 257). D’Arcy et al. (2009) and Hovav and D’Arcy (2012) also examine security violations that 
closely resemble deviant behavior. They examine IS misuse intention, which D’Arcy et al. (2009) define as “an individual’s 
intention to perform a behavior that is defined by the organization as a misuse of IS resources” (p. 81). 
Well-intentioned Misbehavior 
Well-intentioned misbehavior is characterized by high behavioral awareness, high maliciousness, and other-benefitting 
motives. We define well-intentioned misbehavior as the intentional commission of insecure behaviors by an individual with 
the intent of bettering the organization or someone within the organization (e.g., a manager or coworker). Well-intentioned 
misbehavior differs from deviant behavior based on the motive behind the behavior. Whereas deviant behavior is conducted 
with the intent to gratify oneself, well-intentioned misbehavior is conducted to help others or improve the organizational 
environment.  
Umphress and Bingham (2011) examine misbehavior in a non-IS setting. They study unethical pro-organizational behaviors. 
They suggest that employees may knowingly engage in harmful behaviors with the intent of benefiting the organization or a 
leader of the organization. Ultimately, they suggest that unethical pro-organizational behaviors can lead to serious problems 
for the organization. This is an interesting direction for future IS research. For example, deviant pro-organizational behaviors 
may help to explain why doctors are reluctant to follow nationally mandated health privacy standards. It may be that doctors 
violate these standards with the intent to improve the overall efficiency and quality of health for their patients. Deviant pro-
organizational behaviors may also explain security violations related to the Sarbanes-Oxely Act.  
Posey et al. (2011) offer an example of this type of noncompliant behavior in IS security literature. They examine justice-
related security violations. They introduce justice theory to information security research which suggests that individuals may 
seek to remedy unfair organizational practices through deviant behavior (Aquino, Tripp and Bies, 2006; Tyler and Blader, 
2000). Posey et al. (2011) find that employees may violate security policy as a stand against unfair security practices, such as 
computer monitoring. Studies that focus on procedural and distributive injustice are likely to fall in this category. 
DISCUSSION 
This paper has provided a review of security studies to determine what conceptualizations of compliance and noncompliance 
exist in the literature. Additionally, this paper has extracted important dimensions from these studies and from non-IS 
literature to form a taxonomy of compliant and noncompliant behaviors. The dimensions described in this paper are mostly 
derived from previous IS security studies and are only augmented by typologies from other disciplines. The typologies in this 
paper provide important direction for future research. IS security researchers should carefully select the type of compliance 
they want to study before collecting data.  
Managers should be aware of the type of security compliance they desire to promote in their organizations. The unintentional 
promotion of one form of compliance could lead to unintended consequences. For example, managers who want committed 
compliance from employees may find it difficult to attain if managers use extrinsic motivation to entice or coerce 
compliance. Commitment is more likely to occur when employees are intrinsically motivated (Ryan and Deci, 1985). 
Extrinsic motivation is more likely to promote rote compliance than true commitment, as commitment requires and inward 
desire. Additionally, managers should be aware that different forms of noncompliance exist. It is not likely that prioritized 
negligence should be treated or remedied in the same manner as deviant behavior. Managers’ approaches to improving 
noncompliant behaviors should be tailored toward the particular form of noncompliance an employee engages in. Sanctions 
and monitoring may be appropriate for deterring employees’ harmful intentions, but may do little to promote compliant 
behaviors when noncompliance is the result of work overload. 
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Completing the Research 
The taxonomy presented above is based on an initial coding of the articles. More rigorous coding practices will be used as the 
research progresses. Additionally, more non-IS literature will be reviewed and implemented into the development of the 
taxonomies. The purpose of this paper is to provide a high-level view of types of compliance and noncompliance. As coding 
continues, we will continue to seek a balance between extremely granular conceptualizations of compliance and 
noncompliance and broad conceptualizations. Future studies may extend parts of our taxonomy to examine more granular 
conceptualizations of compliance and noncompliance. 
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